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Abstract
We examine a society in which individuals gain utility from income and social
approbation. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, signalled through social
mobility. Two environments are studied: in one players care for absolute approba-
tion; in the other relative approbation matters. In both environments, individuals’
quest for approbation both affects and is affected by social structure. We study the
long run implications of that interaction on social organization. Various forms of dy-
nasties and meritocracies are possible. Even though social mobility is driven purely
by meritocratic principles, pure dynasties can emerge.
1 Introduction
Most people get value from the approbation of others. The idea that our peers believe
we are “special” in some (positive) way tends to increase our utility levels. At the same
time there is a fairly natural tendency to grant this approbation when someone does seem
special. Different societies, and one society at different points in time, have different ideas
about what counts as special in this regard. In a caste society or an old aristocracy, blood
∗We gratefully acknowledge comments from Avinash Dixit, Steve Durlauf, Alan Kirman, Barkley Rosser,
and other participants of the workshop “Networks, Aggregation and Markets” held in Marseilles, June 20
and 21, 2005. Bas Ter Weel and Fre´de´ric Deroian provided useful remarks on an earlier draft. Finally, the
suggestions of two anonymous referees and Alain Trannoy were extremely helpful in improving the paper.
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is the key. Approbation is granted to those born into a high caste, and contempt to those
born in a low caste. In a pure meritocracy by contrast, approbation is granted to those
with merit: those who have skills and/or put in high effort.1 Most societies are some mix of
both notions, with the general thought that approbation based on merit is somehow more
modern.
Some sources of approbation are readily visible: skill at basketball or movie acting,
for example, or the social status of one’s forebears. Others, such as intelligence, are not.
The former can simply be displayed; the latter must be signalled by some other means.
One means of signalling high skills of various kinds is to enter a social or income class
that differs from one’s origin class, for example through a particular profession. Social
approbation follows. This is what this paper is about. Individuals try to signal their talent
through the application of effort, which can result in a class change and the acquisition (or
loss) of approbation. As approbation tends to be limited (if some people get more then some
others should get less) the quest for approbation has an impact on social structure, while
at the same time social structure might influence the conditions of approbation acquisition.
The analysis of that interaction is the object of this paper.
1.1 Approbation
The observation that individuals seek approbation from their peers is not new. In the
literature on conspicuous consumption, for instance, public approbation is granted for the
ownership of large wealth. Because the latter is not directly observable it must be signalled
by the consumption of a positional good.2 In that literature, what matters is relative
rather than absolute position. In Frank (1985b), Fershtman et al. (1996), Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004) or Robson (1992), an agent’s position in the population distribution over
some variable enters the utility function directly. Frank (1985b) assumes an individual’s
utility increases with his quantile position in the distribution of consumption levels of
the positional good. Robson, to examine risk taking behaviour, assumes that utility is
determined by an agent’s wealth and his ordinal rank in the wealth distribution. Hopkins
and Kornienko use a similar positional approach to study the effects of income distribution
on excess “conspicuous consumption” and derive the effect of exogenous changes in the
income distribution. Fershtman et al. study the effects of income distribution on talent
allocation and growth when an individual cares about the average level of human capital
in his occupation relative to that in the alternative occupation.
An alternative approach does not “put the others” directly in the utility function,
but lets the concern for status emerge from some non-market tournament whose outcome
enters the utility function (such as access to social circles, clubs, marriage, and so on). In
Cole et al. (1992) and Corneo and Jeanne (1998, 1999), social recognition obtains from
marrying the right (high quality) mate or getting one’s offspring to marry the right mate,
the probability of which is determined by relative position again. In this tradition, desire
1“Meritocracy” was coined by Young (1958). He defined it as a system in which recruitment to social
positions is based solely on merit, defined as the combination of ability and effort.
2For early insights into conspicuous consumption see Marshall (1890) and Veblen (1899). A comprehen-
sive survey on status and economic decisions is Weiss and Fershtman (1998). For stimulating discussions
on the competition for approbation, status and other scarce social resources see Hirsch (1976) and Frank
(1985a).
2
Page 2 of 23 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
for status is instrumental, arising endogenously from agents’ attempts to manipulate a
different argument of the utility function.3
Much of this literature concludes that in general the competition for status positions is
self-stultifying: if all agents make equivalent attempts to move up the hierarchy (buying cars
that are twice as big as their current ones), the result is simply an increase in the resources
spent in signalling and no relative movement of agents within the hierarchy. Thus even
if this behaviour generates growth in output, it generally does not raise aggregate welfare
and tends to constitute a social waste. Ireland (1998), for example, presents this argument,
and argues that a tax can be an effective response to this over-consumption problem.4
1.2 Mobility
In the model we develop below, mobility is treated as intrinsically meritocratic: if an agent
has ability and works, he or she will rise (or stay in the top). Thus in terms of motivation
(incentives) agents live in a meritocratic system in the sense that social promotion will
take place if an agent applies effort to skill, and demotion will happen if effort and skill
are lacking. This is the type of regime observed in the empirical sociology literature. In
recent years the discussion there has moved from whether or not a society is meritocratic
to whether the degree to which it is a meritocracy has changed (see the introduction to
Breen and Goldthorpe 2001). On one side, Saunders (1997) and Bond and Saunders (1999),
for example, contend that now in the U.K. a person’s eventual social status is determined
by his or her intelligence and effort (following Young’s initial definition quite closely). On
the other side, Savage and Egerton (1997) show that high ability, high status children are
likely to be high status adults, whereas low ability, low status children are still likely to
be low status adults: specifically, the probability of ending in the service (upper) class
is equal for low ability/high status children and high ability/low status children (about
30 percent). Similarly, Breen and Goldthorpe (1999) find that origin class continues to
play a strong role. The difference falls when we correct for merit, and merit variables are
statistically significant, but they conclude that children from lower classes need to show
considerably more merit to enter a particular (higher) class than do higher class children
(see also Boudon 1974). The empirical literature has had a focus on the correlation between
the status (or income) of a child and that of its parent, but typically correcting for the
effects of meritocratic variables is statistically significant.5 Even those authors who contend
that data do not show meritocracies in the strongest sense of Young find that ability and
3Another interesting approach is provided by Ireland (1998), who introduces “others” into preferences
by making an agent’s utility a convex combination of his or her own fundamental utility and spectators’
estimate of that utility.
4We must also note Corneo and Jeanne (1998) who find that status-seeking can be beneficial, provided
it happens early in the life cycle. It is also possible to find a link between income distribution and status-
seeking activities, whereby differences in taste for status among rich and poor induce different investment
decisions (regarding for instance schooling) which can in turn further affect income distribution and growth.
See the survey by Weiss and Fershtman (section 3.4) on these issues.
5In addition to the authors cited, see for example Deardon et. al (1997) and Johnson and Reed (1996).
In general, one of the problems that arises (and is admitted by participants) in this debate is the difficulty
of defining and measuring “ability” and “effort”. For more on how these forces affect social mobility more
generally, see for example Treiman and Ganzeboom (1990), Breen and Goldthorpe (2001), Deardon et al.
(1997) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002).
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effort do have effects on destination class.
In the current paper we build on a framework initially presented in Piketty (1998). In
that paper social approbation is given to an unobservable trait which must be signalled
through an agent’s social mobility. Social mobility thus contributes to utility in two ways:
directly, through its effect on income, and instrumentally, in its contribution to public
approbation. This gives agents an incentive to try to enter (or to stay in) the high income
class. Mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving origin, effort and ability, as
discussed in the empirical literature on social mobility just referred to. Based on observed
social mobility, society forms beliefs about who deserves approbation, thereby creating a
social contest. Individual effort-provision decisions thus have collective implications on
class composition.6
Our model simplifies Piketty’s general structure by making effort levels discrete and
considering a more compact mobility “production function”. We add a dynamic structure
in which agents are born into a social class, but each generation makes its own effort
decisions. This creates a repeated one-shot game in a changing environment. Depending
on the importance of the approbation motive and the prevalence of talent, we show that a
variety of organizations are supported, involving both dynastic and meritocratic elements.
One interesting result is that under identifiable conditions a purely dynastic structure can
still emerge, in which all agents remain in the social class of their parents. Here, not only is
there zero structural mobility, but the much stronger condition that there is zero exchange
mobility is also present.7 This suggests that defining or identifying a meritocracy may not
simply be a matter of observing inter-generational (im)mobility. In the debate between
Saunders (1997) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1999), for example, much of the argument is
about defining the appropriate measure for inter-class mobility.8 Whether or not we observe
meritocratic mobility may well turn on these definitions, but our model demonstrates that
a society in which all promotion is done explicitly on meritocratic principles can still have
a frozen social structure with no inter-generational mobility at all. Given that, the debate
about whether a society is or is not meritocratic cannot necessarily be solved by agreeing
on the definition of mobility.
In the second part of the paper we introduce the notion of relative approbation, referring
to the idea that agents care not about absolute approbation levels but rather about their
standings in the approbation distribution. That competition for relative approbation (in
the manner of Frank and the papers discussed above) creates a global feedback from the
class structure to the value of approbation. While competition for absolute approbation
6Piketty’s concern revolves around the possibility that in two equivalent societies there can be one
in which agents actively seek status whereas in the other status-seeking behaviour is absent. Besides
multiplicity, Piketty also discusses the way the quest for status can amplify initial inequalities.
7“Structural mobility” refers to net mobility and the change in relative sizes of classes; “exchange
mobility” refers to gross mobility, and whether some agents change class (possibly offset by other agents
changing in the opposite direction)..
8Saunders argues that absolute, rather than relative mobility is a preferred measure, but if relative
mobility is under discussion then disparity ratios (which measure the chances that individuals of different
origin classes are found in a particular destination class) rather than odds ratios (which measure those
chances in comparison with those same individuals being found in some other class) should be used.
Saunders argues that using absolute mobility or disparity ratios indicate that Britain is meritocratic to a
great extent, whereas Breen and Goldthorpe argue that odds ratios show that it is not.
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was essentially intra-class, competition for relative approbation becomes inter-class. In this
case too much upward mobility reduces the value of the approbation gained by high class
individuals. While not reducing the income associated with the upper class, it reduces
the net inducement to attempt to enter, and thus changes the amount of entry to it. In
general, this provides a regulating effect on mobility and class structure. Class structure
and effort thereby become jointly endogenous. The effect of the approbation motive on
long run social organization in this context is not the same as what we observed in the
absolute approbation environment, and the welfare conclusions also differ.
2 The model
Society consists of two locations, {0, 1}, which correspond to the lower and upper classes
respectively. It is populated by a continuum S of risk-neutral individuals having total
measure normalized to unity. Let x designate the measure of individuals who belong to
the upper class. Each individual i ∈ S lives for one period during which he has a chance
to move between the two classes. Social mobility for i is influenced by three factors: his
origin `i ∈ {0, 1}, his ability αi ∈ {a,A} (high or low) and the level of effort, ei ∈ {e, E}
(also high or low).
Individuals’ origins are inherited without error from their parents. Abilities are identi-
cally and independently distributed: independently from the abilities of other agents, and
independently of the social class of the agent.9 Specifically αi is high with probability
p ∈ (0, 1), which is known to everyone. Thus there is inter-generational inertia in social
class, but none in ability. Finally effort, alone, is under the control of the agent. Depending
on these three factors an individual can stay in his origin class, be promoted to the higher
class or be demoted to the lower class.
Within a single time period, and knowing his origin class and own ability, an agent
chooses an effort level to maximize expected utility. He then moves from his origin to
destination class (which may be the same) and collects the income of that class. Finally
the agent dies after having produced, into the same class, a single offspring. This process
then iterates.
2.1 Utility
Utility is driven by net income and public opinion about ability. The former is determined
by an agent’s destination class and effort level; the latter is inferred from publicly observable
social mobility, itself determined by origin, ability and effort. Utility for any agent i is
written
r (zi)− c(ei) + λPr{αi = A|·},
with λ the importance of approbation, c (ei) the cost of producing effort ei with the nor-
malization that c (E) = c and c (e) = 0, and r (zi) the income, again normalized so that
r (0) = 0 and r (1) = 1. Finally Pr{αi = A|·} is the posterior probability placed by society
on i being of high ability conditional on the publicly observable information. The appro-
9In Section 3.3 this assumption is discussed in greater detail.
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bation collected by an agent is equal to the posterior probability of that agent being high
ability and is determined by Bayes’ rule. This is made more precise below.
2.2 Mobility
There are three traits — origin, ability, effort — and each exerts a positive influence on the
probability that an agent ends up in the upper class. We adopt a (stochastic) majority rule
for social mobility. If an agent moves, it is to the class corresponding to the majority of his
three attributes: origin, ability and effort. Thus the possibility of class change only arises
for high-effort, high-ability lower class (who can move up) and low-effort, low-ability rich
(who can fall). Mobility is not deterministic though: a high-effort, high-ability poor agent
rises with probability u, while a low-effort, low-ability rich agent falls with probability d,
as summarized in Table 1.
Origin Ability Effort Social mobility
`i αi ei Pr{zi = 1|`i, αi, ei}
1 A E 1
1 A e 1
1 a E 1
0 A E u
1 a e 1− d
0 A e 0
0 a E 0
0 a e 0
Table 1: The probabilistic mechanism driving social mobility.
The parameters u and d determine up and down mobility in a transparent way. However,
if u = d = 1 the mobility rule becomes deterministic, and mobility for the lower class or
immobility for the upper class would fully reveal abilities. To avoid this unrealistic (and
uninteresting) case, we assume that u, d ∈ (0, 1).
Which social organizations does the mobility mechanism in Table 1 permit? Because
we have included origin class as a determinant of mobility, a pure meritocracy (as defined
by Young, see Footnote 1), in which social position is determined solely by merit, is not
possible.10 In our structure inertia is introduced through origin class and has the effect
of making effort and talent substitutes for the upper class but complements for the lower.
10That is, in a pure meritocracy the upper class would contain only and all people who are both high-
skilled and who put in high-effort; the lower class would contain all others. In a more general setting, the
highest class would contain those with the highest skills and highest effort; the lowest class would contain
those with the lowest skills and lowest effort, and intermediate classes would contain intermediate levels of
skill and effort, in appropriate combinations. As we have only two social classes, our structure is somewhat
less nuanced.
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Thus it will always be possible for the talented rich to be idle and still maintain his rank,
while the talented idle poor will never leave the lower class. Thus outcomes will be at
best partial meritocracies, which we define here. In the terminology we use below, a posi-
tive meritocracy rewards high-skilled, high-effort agents with upward mobility. A negative
meritocracy punishes low-effort, low-skilled agents with downward mobility. We also will
use meritocracy to refer to a mixed situation in which high-skilled, high-effort agents rise
while low-skilled, low-effort agents fall. Finally, a dynasty is a social structure in which
no agent leaves the social class in which he was born. These terms all refer to “observ-
able” social-mobility structures and make no reference to the underlying principles that
determine mobility. One question is whether rational responses to individual incentives
will permit different regimes to emerge.
3 Equilibrium strategies and stationary structures
Inferences about ability and thus optimal behaviour are affected by what is public and
what is private knowledge. We focus on the case in which an individual knows both his
ability and his effort, but neither is publicly observable. By contrast social mobility, which
serves as a signal of ability, is publicly observable. Alternative information regimes are
briefly discussed at the end of the section.
3.1 Equilibrium strategies
The environment considered here has a continuum of players who can be one of 4 types,
defined by origin and ability, and play one of two possible pure strategies.11 Let the 4-tuple
q = (q0,A, q0,a, q1,A, q1,a) be the proportion of agents of each type who expend high effort.
For given q and under the assumption of unobservable effort and ability, application of
Bayes’ rule gives the posterior probability for a low origin agent i to be high-ability as
Pr {αi = A|0, 0, q} = p− puq0,A
1− puq0,A ,
Pr {αi = A|0, 1, q} =
{
1 if q0,A > 0,
0 if q0,A = 0.
(1)
Similarly the posterior probability for a high origin agent i to be high-ability is
Pr {αi = A|1, 1, q} = p
1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a) ,
Pr {αi = A|1, 0, q} = 0. (2)
Note that if an agent changes class, the signal is definitive, whereas not changing class is
only imperfectly informative.
Utility for a high-ability lower class agent is
u0,A(ei, q) =
{
u (1 + λPr{αi = A|0, 1, q}) + (1− u)λPr{αi = A|0, 0; q} − c if ei = E,
λPr{αi = A|0, 0; q} if ei = e.
11For general results on games of that class, see for instance Schmeidler (1973).
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The same calculations based on the elements in Table 1 and the above posteriors yield
similar expressions for the utility levels of the 3 others types of agents. A player’s utility
depends only on q and the player’s own strategy (which does not affect q). Now define
∆`,α(q) = u`,α(E, q)− u`,α(e, q) as the incentives towards high effort of an agent of origin z
and ability α. They are written
∆0,a(q) = −c,
∆1,A(q) = −c,
∆0,A(q) = u+ λ
u (1− p)
1− puq0,A − c,
∆1,a(q) = d+ λ
dp
1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a) − c.
(3)
An equilibrium can now be defined. A 4-tuple q∗ = (q∗0,A, q
∗
0,a, q
∗
1,A, q
∗
1,a) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if and only if one of the three following conditions holds true: (i) q∗`,α = 0
and ∆`,α(q
∗) ≤ 0; (ii) q∗`,α = 1 and ∆`,α(q∗) ≥ 0; (iii) q∗`,α ∈ (0, 1) and ∆`,α(q∗) = 0, for all
` ∈ {0, 1} and α ∈ {a,A}. Throughout we refer to an equilibrium by the 4-tuple q∗ of the
proportions of each type that expend E in that equilibrium.
From the equations in (3), low-origin low-ability and high-origin high-ability agents
never have incentives to provide E. Thus in an equilibrium q∗0,a = q
∗
1,A = 0. On the other
hand both high-origin low-ability and low-origin high-ability agents can prefer high effort
over some parameter range(s).12 Turning to low-origin high-ability agents and setting
∆0,A(q) = 0 yields
q0 =
−λu (1− p) + c− u
up (c− u) ,
the asymmetric equilibrium (provided q0 ∈ (0, 1)). In addition, setting q0,A = 0 and
∆0,A(q) ≤ 0 gives
λ ≤ c− u
u (1− p) = λ0, (4)
while setting q0,A = 1 and ∆0,A(q) ≥ 0 gives
λ ≥ c− u
u (1− p) (1− pu) = Λ0. (5)
As Λ0 < λ0 there is a region of multiple equilibria when Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0, where q∗0,A = 0, q0
or 1 are all possible.13 Similar reasoning for low ability upper class gives
q1 = 1 +
λp
(c− d) (1− p) −
1
d (1− p)
and the critical values of the approbation motive
λ1 =
c− d
pd
(1− d (1− p)) , (6)
Λ1 =
c− d
pd
. (7)
12To ensure that income effects alone are not enough to induce high effort, we assume that c > max{u, d}.
13The 3 equilibria that exist when Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0 are Pareto ranked, q∗0,A = 0 yields the largest utility,
before q0 and 1.
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This time however λ1 < Λ1, thus when λ1 ≤ λ ≤ Λ1 only the asymmetric equilibrium is
possible. Equilibrium behaviour in relation to the approbation motive λ is summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium is characterized by
q∗0,a = 0,
q∗1,A = 0,
q∗0,A =

0 if λ < Λ0,
{0, q0, 1} if Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
1 if λ0 < λ,
q∗1,a =

0 if λ < λ1,
q1 if λ1 ≤ λ ≤ Λ1,
1 if Λ1 < λ.
Proof. Direct from the expressions in (3) and the discussion above.
Multiplicity for talented lower class arises because in the posterior, mobility is fully in-
formative whereas the informativeness of immobility increases with q0,A, yielding incentives
towards E that are largest when q0,A = 1. This is so because effort and talent are comple-
ments in the mobility function (an effect also at work in Piketty). Thus when Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
the opinion that lack of promotion expresses lack of talent is equally possible as the opinion
that lack of promotion merely reflects bad luck. High society agents have a class advantage:
for them talent and effort enter the mobility technology as perfect substitutes, doing away
with multiple equilibria.
The approbation motive increases the incentives towards E, shifting left the critical
λ-values. Other effects of the parameters of the model are easily seen. Increasing the
stochastic components of social mobility u and d also shifts left the critical λ-values. The
effect of p is class-specific: a talented lower class who is rare (low p) gains a lot by signalling
his talent, but when p is large the gain is smaller as everyone is already “presumed” to
be smart. By contrast, a talentless high society in a world of widespread talent (large p)
who fails to remain high society loses a lot: he is easily singled out as low-ability. Thus a
stronger approbation motive is needed to induce high effort from the poor if high-ability is
common, whereas for the rich it is when high-ability is rare.
3.2 Evolution of social structure
Observation of modern societies shows not only that exchange mobility, in which individuals
move from one class to another, is important, but also that structural mobility, wherein
the overall structure of classes changes, can be observed.14 We study that issue in the
overlapping structure that has been set forth, with social class being inherited without
error. The rules of mobility in Table 1 have been discussed in detail, but we should note
again here that the principle is meritocratic in the following sense: an agent can only rise if
he or she has both high skill and high effort; an agent can only fall if he or she has both low
14See Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for example.
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skill and low effort. This principle remains fixed throughout. The conditions under which
this meritocratic principle results in any version of a meritocratic observable is examined
now.
Social structure will evolve as a discrete time process with effort levels determining social
movements. The resulting structure forms the environment in which the next generation
makes decisions about effort provision. Let xt be the measure of the upper class at time
t. The evolution of social structure is obtained by considering the rates of up and down
mobility. The rate of inflow to high society is r+(x) = (1/x − 1)puq∗0,A, whereas the
rate of outflow from high society is r−(x) = (1 − p)d(1 − q∗1,a). As a result he rate of
change in x is simply r+(x) − r−(x), and the time evolution of high society is written
xt+1 = xt{1 + r+(xt)− r−(xt)} = T (xt).
3.2 Evolution of social structure
Observation of modern societies shows not only that exchange mobility, in which individuals
move from one class to another, is important, but also that structural mobility, wherein
the overall structure of classes changes, can be observed.14 We study that issue in the
overlapping structure that has been set forth, with social class being inherited without
error. The rules of mobility in Table 1 have been discussed in detail, but we should note
again here that the principle is meritocratic in the following sense: an agent can only rise if
he or she has both high skill and high eﬀort; an agent can only fall if he or she has both low
skill and low eﬀort. This principle remains fixed throughout. The conditions under which
this meritocratic principle results in any version of a meritocratic observable is examined
now.
Social structure will evolve as a discrete time process with eﬀort levels determining social
movements. The resulting structure forms the environment in which the next generation
makes decisions about eﬀort provision. Let xt be the measure of the upper class at time
t. The evolution of social structure is obtained by considering the rates of up and down
mobility. The rate of inflow to high society is r+(x) = (1/x − 1)puq∗0,A, whereas the
rate of outflow from high society is r−(x) = (1 − p)d(1 − q∗1,a). As a result the rate of
change in x is simply r+(x) − r−(x), and the time evolution of high society is written
xt+1 = xt{1 + r+(xt)− r−(xt)} = T (xt).
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Table 2: The equilibrium q∗0,A and q
∗
1,a (left panel) and the map T for p = .1, u = .2,
d = .21, c = .3 and λ = .6 (right panel).
In Figure 2 above an illustrative example is provided. Low society always provides E
(circles on the left panel) while high society always provides e (thick black curve on the
left panel). These parameters yield x∞ = .096 as the unique stationary outcome, which is
a meritocracy. The proposition below summarizes the results.
14See Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for example.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium q∗0,A and q
∗
1,a (left anel) nd the map T for p = .1, u = .2,
d = .21, c = .3 and λ = .6 (right panel).
In Figure 1 above an illustrative example is provided. Low society always provides E
(circles on the left panel) while high society always provides e (thick black curve on the
left panel). These parameters yield x∞ = .096 as the unique stationary outcome, which is
a meritocracy. The proposition below summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 Consider three cases, as defined by critical values for the upper class.
• Suppose λ < λ1 (i.e. low effort is optimal for low-ability high-origin agents). Then
x∞ =

0 if λ < Λ0,{
0, up
up+d(1−p) ,
u(λp−λ−1)+c
u(λp−λ−1)+c+d((c−u)(1−p)
}
if Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
up
up+d(1−p) if λ0 < λ.
• Suppose Λ1 < λ (i.e. high effort is optimal for low-ability high-origin agents). Then
x∞ =

x0 if λ < Λ0,
{x0, 1} if Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
1 if λ0 < λ..
• Suppose λ1 ≤ λ ≤ Λ1 (i.e. a share q1 of low-ability high-origin agents provides high
effort). Then
x∞ =

0 if λ < Λ0,{
0, up
up+d(1−p)(1−q1) ,
(u(−λ(1−p)−1)+c)(c−d)
(2u+λ−2c)(d−c)+λp(u−d)
}
if Λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0,
up
up+d(1−p)(1−q1) if λ0 < λ.
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Proof. When a proportion 1 − q∗1,a of low ability high origin agents gives e, they exit
from the upper class, causing it to decline at a rate (1 − p)(1 − q∗1,a)d. If the high-ability
low origin agents give high effort in proportion q∗0,A, they enter the upper class at a rate
(1/x − 1)pq∗0,Au. If only the first motion exists (when λ < λ1 and λ < Λ0), then the only
steady state of the system is x∞ = 0. When only the second motion exists, each period the
upper class grows, and x∞ = 1 is the only steady state of the system. In the intermediate
cases where both motions exists, the steady state is found by solving r+(x) = r−(x), and
the proposition follows simply, case by case.
Effort levels and the resulting social structure depend on λ0,Λ0, λ1 and Λ1, which, under
different parameter values, occupy different positions along the approbation motive axis.
There are essentially two general cases: when the lower class thresholds are below the upper
class ones, and vice versa. Which situation obtains depends on the prevalence of high ability.
As ∂λ0/∂p, ∂Λ0/∂p > 0 and ∂λ1/∂p, ∂Λ1/∂p < 0, the first situation Λ0 < λ0 < λ1 < Λ1
obtains when talent is rare (low p) whereas the second situation λ1 < Λ1 < Λ0 < λ0 is
associated with talent being common (high p). Figure 2 summarizes the results for these
two polar orderings.15 The solid segments represent flows out of the lower class into the
upper one, while the dashed segments represent flows from the upper class to the lower
one.
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Figure 1: Gross flows into and out of the upper class as functions of the approbation motive
λ.
each generation has a share 1 − p) continually move down while no one even attempts
to go up. Society is decaying, the mobility function punishes the idle rich who have low
ability, the observed social pattern is a negative meritocracy. Eventually, by the attrition
of those with low ability, the upper class is reduced to zero, and while agents continue to
value approbation, the concern for status is no longer manifest or observable since there
is no longer any social mobility. By contrast, when λ is high all potentially mobile agents
give high eﬀort, and while the upper class is never left it is continuously entered by lower
class high-ability strivers (of which each generation has a share p). The mobility function
rewards low-origin, high-ability agents who work hard, the observed social pattern is a
positive meritocracy. Eventually, though, everyone becomes a member of the upper class
and again approbation-seeking ceases to be visible.
For intermediate λ-values, when talent is rare (upper part in Figure 1) both up and down
mobility take place. Though high society converges to a stationary size and structural mo-
bility ceases, systematic turmoil in the social structure, that is exchange mobility, persists.
It is a meritocracy in that high-ability lower-class workers rise, and low-ability upper-class
shirkers fall (Λ0 < λ < λ1). However, for this regime to be established, high ability must be
un-common. Only when approbation is granted for rare traits will a meritocratic society
be observed in practice.
On the other hand, again in the middle ground, when high ability is common (lower
12
Figure 2: Gross flows into and out of the upper class as fu ctio s of he approbation motive
λ.
Consider first the extreme c ses of very weak or very strong approbation motives. When
λ is low all agents give low effort, and the less able members of the upper class (of which
each generation has a sh re 1 − p) continually move down while no one even attempts
to go up. Society is decaying, the mobil function punishes the idle rich who have low
ability, the observed soci l pattern is negative me itocracy. Eventually, by the attrition
of those with low ability, and the up er class is reduced to zero, and while agents continue
15The three other possible orderings of the roots along the approbation axis yield situations that are
similar to but slightly more intricate than the two we present.
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to value approbation, the concern for status is no longer manifest or observable since there
is no longer any social mobility. By contrast, when λ is high all potentially mobile agents
give high effort, and while none leave the upper class, it is continuously entered by lower
class high-ability strivers (of which each generation has a share p). The mobility function
rewards low-origin, high-ability agents who work hard, the observed social pattern is a
positive meritocracy. Eventually, though, everyone becomes a member of the upper class,
and again approbation-seeking ceases to be visible.
For intermediate λ-values, when talent is rare (upper part in Figure 2) both up and down
mobility take place. Though high society converges to a stationary size and structural mo-
bility ceases, systematic turmoil in the social structure, that is exchange mobility, persists.
It is a meritocracy in that high-ability lower-class workers rise, and low-ability upper-class
shirkers fall (Λ0 < λ < λ1). However, for this regime to be established, high ability must
be uncommon. Only when approbation is granted for rare traits will a meritocratic society
be observed in practice.
On the other hand, again in the middle ground, when high ability is common (lower
part in Figure 2) a dynasty appears, in which both upper and lower classes are frozen
(Λ1 < λ < Λ0), and neither structural nor exchange mobility are present. In this case
a high-ability, hard-working poor agent could rise, but it is not optimal to expend the
effort to do so; a low-ability high-class agent would fall if he were lazy, but he works to
prevent it. Thus when approbation is granted for commo traits, even though promotion
and demotion mechanisms are inherently meritocratic in design, society does not look like
a meritocracy, but rather like an archetypal dynasty.
3.3 Discussion
Do the informational constraints bearing on the agents significantly affect the behaviour
of the system? Some types of abilities may be difficult even for the agent to observe, and
some types of effort may be more obvious than others. Thus in principle there are four
possible information settings: the observability of effort crossed with the observability of
ability. By re-doing the above calculations under different information regimes, it can be
observed that as knowledge asymmetries decrease, the strength of the approbation motive
needed to induce high effort increases. It becomes more difficult to induce a change of
public perception of ability through social mobility. In the extreme case, where public
and private knowledge is identical, that is, where effort is known and ability unknown, no
finite utility from approbation is high enough to induce any agent to high effort. Which of
the two intermediate knowledge regimes16 is more conducive to high effort depends on the
other parameters.
Symmetric upward and downward mobility (u = d) implies that dynasties exist only
when high ability is common (p > 1/2), while meritocracy exists only when high ability
is uncommon (p < 1/2). Asymmetric mobility can be examined by fixing u and denoting
p∗ = arg{Λ1 = λ0}. This is the value of p at which an aristocratic regime can appear
(recall that meritocracy demands Λ1 > λ > Λ0, as can be seen in Figure 2). Differentiation
16The two intermediate regimes are public and private ignorance of ability with public ignorance but
private knowledge of effort; and public and private knowledge about effort with public ignorance and
private knowledge about ability.
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yields ∂p∗/∂d < 0, that is, increasing the relative ease of downwards mobility increases
the range of p-values compatible with an aristocracy. Now denote p∗ = arg{Λ0 = λ1},
the value of p at which a meritocracy can emerge. Again ∂p∗/∂d < 0; that is, increasing
the relative ease of downwards mobility decreases the range of p-values compatible with a
meritocracy. Thus as downward mobility becomes stronger, observing a dynastic structure
becomes more likely. As one would expect, the size of the upper class decreases with the
relative ease of downward mobility (∂x∞/∂d < 0). The effect of u is the opposite. (In
addition, almost everywhere ∂x∞/∂p > 0, that is, the size of the upper class increases
with the prevalence of high ability) Also note that u > d implies that x∞ > p, while if
d > u then x∞ < p. Put simply, if upward mobility is (relatively) easy, then the high class
will accommodate all of the high-ability agents and some of the low-ability well-born. If
upward mobility is (relatively) difficult, then high-ability low-origin agents cannot rise, and
the upper class does not contain all of the high-ability agents in the population.
We have assumed above that ability was distributed independently across agents. This
is a relatively strong assumption, however, as one might think that ability is correlated
either with origin class or with parental ability.17
The first case, in which ability is (positively) correlated with birth class, can be readily
accommodated in the model. Letting the probabilities of high ability differ for the two
classes by introducing p0 and p1 in the equations in (3) changes the critical values of λ and
thereby changes the relative sizes of the regions in Figure 2. In terms of the evolution of
social structure, the rates at which classes change depend on both p0 and p1. When there
is only attrition or growth the steady states at 0 and 1 are preserved. When both classes
display in and out flows, all the candidate fixed points now have values that depend on p0
and p1. Modulo that difference, the system displays the same qualitative behaviour.
The case in which individual ability is correlated with parental ability is slightly more
complicated. Studying it precisely demands keeping track of the measure of high ability
individuals in each class as they change in time. The proportion of high ability agents in
each class is no longer constant (p), but changes from period to period. This implies that
the critical λ values will change over time. For large or small values of λ this does not cause
particular problems, as either all potentially mobile agents work (and rise) or none do (and
fall). While this changes the proportion of high ability agents in the origin classes, the
implied movements in critical λ values does not change optimal behaviour. Difficulties in
analysing the dynamics arise, however, when λ is near the initial critical values. Changing
proportions of high ability agents in the two classes can change critical values such that
the optimal behaviour for particular types of agents changes from one period to the next.18
17See Checchi et al. (1999) for a model in which ability is transmitted with persistence from one
generation to the next.
18Take the case of perfect correlation, assuming low ability is moderately rare and the approbation motive
is low (i.e. λ ≤ Λ0 < λ0 < λ1 < Λ1). All individuals expend low effort. Supposing that initially the measure
of high ability is p in both classes, after the first period only high ability remain in the upper class and the
share of high ability in the lower class becomes px/ (x+ (1− p) (1− x)) < p. As ∂λ0/∂p, ∂Λ0/∂p > 0 the
critical λs for the lower class are shifted left. Thus now high effort can become an equilibrium for the high
ability poor.
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4 The model with relative approbation
To this point the model has excluded any feedbacks from the distribution of approbation
across players to the value of approbation to a single individual. In this section we consider
the possibility that the approbation gained from social mobility could be related to the size
of the upper class.
In the model developed in section 2, approbation scarcity exists since the total measure
of approbation allocated across the players is always equal to the prior p. There is only
intra-class competition however. In the lower class the total measure of approbation to be
allocated is (1− x) p, each agent who climbs receiving 1, and each agent who stays put
receiving (p− puq0,A) / (1− puq0,A). Similarly the total amount of approbation to allocate
across upper class members is px, divided among those who fall and those who remain.
Thus the competition for the scare approbation resource is circumscribed within each origin
class. A global competition for approbation will exist, though, if agents care not about
absolute levels of approbation, but rather about their levels relative to the rest of the
population. This idea can be formalized by writing the individual’s utility function as
r (zi)− c(ei) + λ
∑
θ<θi
µ (θ) ,
where µ (θ) is the measure of agents with approbation equal to θ.19 This formalization of a
global interaction is very classic in the literature on status and relative utility, where play-
ers manipulate strategically their position in the distribution of some observable variable,
such as the consumption of a positional good (see Frank 1985b, Robson 1992, Hopkins and
Kornienko 2004). A similar interaction structure exists here, with effort provision influenc-
ing observable mobility, which influences approbation levels and thus one’s ranking in the
overall distribution of approbation.
The mobility structure remains as described in section 2, and since we have a only four
sub-populations, we can summarize the equilibrium approbation distribution in Table 2 as
determined by the size, x, of the upper class.
Approbation level θ Measure µ (θ)
0 xd (1− p) (1− q1,a)
(p− puq0,A) / (1− puq0,A) (1− x) (1− puq0,A)
p/ (1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a)) x (1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a))
1 (1− x) puq0,A
Table 2: The frequency distribution of approbation.
The 4 possible approbation values have the property that 0 < (p− puq0,A) / (1− puq0,A) ≤
p/ (1− d (1− p) (1− q1,a)) < 1 for any q0,A and q1,a, with the central equality only when
q0,A = 1− q1,a = 0. Thus the measure of players strictly below any value obtains readily.
As the class distribution (characterised by x) changes, the distribution of approbation
changes as well. Since the value to an individual arises from his position in this distribution,
changes in the distribution can change his incentives. Thus, there is a feedback from the
19In this formalization we use a strict inequality, summing over agents whose approbation is θ < θi. The
results are not sensitive to the assumption that this is strict.
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class distribution to incentives for high effort. In what follows, then, we focus on critical
values of x, rather than λ, and the evolution of x over time, holding λ constant.
4.1 Equilibrium strategies
Following the logic of Section 3.1, the incentives towards high effort for the 4 types of
players are found to be
∆0,a(q) = −c,
∆1,A(q) = −c,
∆0,A(q) = λu (puq0,A − d (1− p) (1− q1,a))x+ u (1 + λ (1− puq0,A))− c,
∆1,a(q) = −dλ (1− puq0,A − d (1− p) (1− q1,a))x+ d (1 + λ (1− puq0,A))− c.
(8)
An immediate observation is that ∂∆1,a(q)/∂x ≤ 0, that is, as the upper class grows, its
members are less likely to put in high effort.
A major difference between Equation 8 and its corresponding Equation 3 in the model
with absolute approbation is that here decisions are not independent across classes. There-
fore, solving simultaneously ∆0,A(q) = ∆1,a(q) = 0 for q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) yields the asymmetric
equilibrium
q0 =
1
2
2du (1 + λ)− uλxd− c (u+ d)
λpu2d (1− x) ,
q1 =
1
2
−λxdu (1− 2d (1− p))− c (u− d)
uλxd2 (1− p) .
Constraining q0 and q1 to take their extreme values {0, 1} defines the critical x-values for
symmetric equilibria. They are written
x0 =
2du (1 + λ)− c (u+ d)
uλd
,
X0 =
2du (1 + λ)− c (u+ d)− 2λpu2d
uλd (1− 2pu) ,
x1 = c
d− u
λd (1− 2d (1− p)) ,
X1 = c
d− u
λd
,
(9)
where q0(x0) = 0; q0(X0) = 1; q1(x1) = 0; q0(X0) = 1. Equilibrium behaviour in relation
to the size of the upper class, x, is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Equilibrium is characterized by
q∗0,a = 0,
q∗1,A = 0,
q∗0,A =

0 if x0 < x,
q0 if X0 ≤ x ≤ x0,
1 if x < X0,
q∗1,a =

0 if x1 < x,
q1 if X1 ≤ x ≤ x1,
1 if x < X1.
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Proof. From Equation 9, q0(x0) = 0; q0(X0) = 1; q1(x1) = 0; q0(X0) = 1, so the
proposition holds ifXi ≤ xi. For the upper class we have already seen that ∂∆1,a(q)/∂x ≤ 0,
thus q∗1,a is weakly decreasing with x, so X1 ≤ x1. For high-ability, low-origin agents,
∂q0/∂x =
1
2
ud (λ+ 2)− c (u+ d)
λpu2d (x− 1)2 ,
which changes sign in λ. Check where it changes sign by solving ∂q0,A/∂x = 0 for λ,
which yields a unique λ∗ = c
d
+ c
u
− 2 > 0 (since we have assumed that c > max(d, u)).
Substituting λ∗ into x0 and X0 we get we get x0 = X0 = 1. For λ < λ∗, X0 < x0 < 1 and
for λ∗ < λ, 1 < x0 < X0. The proposition follows.
To contrast the analysis with the results from Section 3.2, observe that for both classes
the measure of high society has a negative impact on the incentives towards high effort:
a larger high society makes high society less desirable for both potential entrants and
incumbents.
4.2 Evolution of social structure
As in Section 3.2, we model a structure in which an agent’s origin class is inherited without
error from its parent. Following the logic of that section, the evolution of social structure
is described by xt+1 = xt{1 + r+(xt)− r−(xt)} = T (xt), with r+(x) = (1/x− 1)puq∗0,A and
r−(x) = (1−p)d(1−q∗1,a). Figure 3 shows an illustrative example using the same parameter
values as in Figure 1. Low-origin agents work hard when the upper class is small. That
group moves smoothly, but quickly to low effort as the upper class grows (over the range
[X0, x0]), and is shown as circles on the left panel. Also, because d > u, there is a strategy
change for high-origin agents from E to e over [X1, x1] (thick black curve on the left panel).
These changes in strategy cause changes in the slope of the map on the right panel at the
corresponding critical x-values.
4.2 Evolution of social structure
As in Section 3.2, we model a structure in which an agent’s origin class is inherited without
error from its parent. Following the logic of that section, the evolution of social structure
is described by xt+1 = xt{1 + r+(xt)− r−(xt)} = T (xt), with r+(x) = (1/x− 1)puq∗0,A and
r−(x) = (1−p)d(1−q∗1,a). Figure 4 shows an illustrative example using the same parameter
values as in Figure 2. Low-origin agents work hard when the upper class is small. That
group moves smoothly, but quickly t low eﬀort as the upper class grows (over the range
[X0, x0]), and is shown as circles on the left panel. Also, because d > u, there is a strategy
change for high-origin agents from E to e over [X1, x1] (thick black curv on the left panel).
These changes in strategy cause changes in the slope of the map on the right panel at the
corresponding critical x-values.
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Table 4: The equilibrium q∗0,A and q
∗
1,a (left panel) and the map T describing the evolution
of the measure of high society for p = .5, u = .2, d = .21, c = .3 and λ = .6 (right panel).
We can completely characterise the steady state social structure. Define λ∗ = −1 +
c (u+ d) /2du to be the value of the approbation motive such that some low-origin agents
start expending high eﬀort. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 Consider two cases, as defined by the ordering of u and d.
• Suppose u ≥ d. Then
x∞ =
(
0 if λ ≤ λ∗,n
up
up+d(1−p) ,
2du(1+λ)−c(u+d)
duλ(1+2d(1−p))
o
if λ > λ∗.
• Suppose u < d. Then
x∞ =
½ {xt=0, X1} if λ ≤ λ∗,
{xt=0, x0, X1, x∗} if λ > λ∗,
17
Figure 3: The equilibrium q∗0,A and q
∗
1,a (left panel) and the map T describing the evolution
of the measure of high society for p = .5, u = .2, d = .21, c = .3 and λ = .6 (right panel).
We can completely characterise the steady state social structure. Define λ∗ = −1 +
c (u+ d) /2du to be the value of the approbation motive such that some low-origin agents
start expending high effort. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 Consider two cases, as defined by the ordering of u and d.
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• Suppose u ≥ d. Then
x∞ =
{
0 if λ ≤ λ∗,{
up
up+d(1−p) ,
2du(1+λ)−c(u+d)
duλ(1+2d(1−p))
}
if λ > λ∗.
• Suppose u < d. Then
x∞ =
{ {xt=0, X1} if λ ≤ λ∗,
{xt=0, x0, X1, x∗} if λ > λ∗,
with x∗ defined as argx{(1/x− 1)puq∗0,A = (1− p)d(1− q∗1,a)},, and discussed below.
Proof. The proof consists of defining fixed points of the map T (x), and showing that
they are stable. T (x) is a continuous mapping of the unit interval onto itself. Therefore
a stable fixed point (possibly extreme) always exists. If an interior fixed point exists, it is
stable. Differentiate T (x) yields
T ′(x) = 1− pu
(
q∗0,A − (1− x)
∂q∗0,A
∂x
)
− (1− p) d
(
1− q∗1,a − x
∂q∗1,a
∂x
)
.
If q∗0,A or q
∗
1,a belongs to {0, 1}, their derivatives are 0. In either case T ∗(x) ≤ 1. For the
interior cases, simple calculation and substitution of the derivatives yields 0 ≤ T ′(x) ≤ 1.
Thus any interior fixed point is stable. If there is no interior fixed point one of the extreme
points is stable.
Now we turn to the fixed points, which follow from substituting defined parameter
values into T (x). If u ≥ d then x1 ≤ 0 and q∗1,a = 0, so departures from the upper class
happen at the rate r−(x) = (1− p)d. There are two cases for the lower class: a) if λ ≤ λ∗,
q∗0,A = 0 and there is no upward motion; the upper class shrinks indefinitely, the lower class
grows indefinitely, until, in the limit, x = 0; b) if λ > λ∗ then q∗0,A > 0, and assuming
that xt=0 > 0, there is positive upward motion over [0, x0). Since in this case T (0) > 0
and T (1) = 1− (1− p)d < 1 there is a unique stable stationary size of the upper class. If
the crossing takes place before x0 then x
∞ = up
up+d(1−p) , the root also identified in Section
3.2. If the crossing is between x0 and X0 then x
∞ = argx{(1/x − 1)puq∗0,A = (1 − p)d} =
2du(1+λ)−c(u+d)
duλ(1+2d(1−p)) .
Suppose now u < d. Then q∗1,a = 1 over [0, X1], and 0 < q
∗
1,a < 1 over (X1, x1). If λ ≤ λ∗,
then q∗0,A = 0 and there is no upward motion. Thus if x
t=0 ∈ [0, X1] society is a dynasty
since there is neither upward nor downward motion. When xt=0 > X1 a proportion 1− q∗1,a
of high society is demoted each period. This is compensated by no inflow; society is a
negative meritocracy and x∞ = X1. (In this case the society approaches a dynasty.) Thus
in that parameter region x∞ ∈ [0, X1]. Finally if λ > λ∗ several situations are possible,
depending on the ordering of critical x-values. With similar arguments about flows, it is
possible to show the following. When x0 < X1, any x ∈ [x0, X1] is stationary and society is
either a dynasty if xt=0 ∈ [x0, X1] or a (positive or negative)meritocracy with x∞ ∈ {x0, X1}
if xt=0 /∈ [x0, X1]. By contrast, when x0 ≥ X1, there is never the conjunction of a purely
industrious upper class and a purely lazy lower class, thus a unique x∞ with meritocratic
features will obtain, with x∗ = argx{(1/x− 1)puq∗0,A = (1− p)d(1− q∗1,a)}.
Depending on the relative importance of the possibility of falling against the potential
of a promotion, different long run situations arise. With relatively easier upwards mobility
17
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(u > d) society has only lazy rich. The poor (or a fraction of them) will be industrious
if the approbation motive is strong enough (λ > λ∗), which results in a meritocracy. But
as soon as a high-ability poor has risen, he turns into a passive rich, as do his offspring,
eventually leading the family back to the lower class. Even if high effort prevails over the
whole unit interval for the high ability poor, high society is never bigger than up
up+d(1−p) ,
the root already identified in Section 3.2.
By contrast, with relatively harder upwards mobility (u < d) society has (at least a
fraction of) industrious rich, and the lower is the approbation motive the more numerous
are the industrious rich; for them λ has a negative effect on the willingness to give high
effort. This is not so for the poor, who demand that λ > λ∗ to start providing high effort.
Hence below λ∗ no poor rises, while below X1 no rich falls. This implies a dynasty on the
interval [0, X1] . On the right side of X1 there is (at least partial) attrition in the upper
class; thus in the absence of lower class promotion negative meritocracy dynamics leads
society to X1. Finally when λ > λ
∗ the conjunction of (at least partial) lower and upper
class effort gives rise most of the time to a meritocracy with a unique stationary state
(when x0 ≥ X1), though it is also possible (when x0 < X1) that a dynasty establishes itself,
with no extreme situation part of it.
When contrasted with Section 3.2, here the approbation motive affects the rich and
the poor differently: there is always a value of λ above which the poor will play E, while
(provided u < d) the provision of E by the rich, by contrast, demands a low enough
approbation motive. In general a society whose members care a lot for relative approbation
will display meritocratic features, while one in which it is not so will tend to be dynastic.
4.3 Welfare
Consider total utility as the measure of social welfare. The low-ability poor and high-ability
rich are immobile whatever they do, so both the private and social optimum for them is to
expend low effort, in both models.
When absolute approbation matters as in Section 3.2, upper class low-ability and lower
class high-ability face independent problems which can be solved as such. Defining s1 as
the socially optimal effort level for the low-ability upper class, social optimality requires
the maximization of s1(1 + λp/[1 − d (1− p) (1− s1)] − c) + (1− s1) (1− d) (1 + λp/[1 −
d (1− p) (1− s1)]). The first order condition yields two conjugate solutions, of which one
is always negative. The second order condition for a maximum holds at
s1 =
1
c− d
− (c− d) (1− (1− p) d) + p√dλ (c− d)
(1− p) d .
Direct computation shows that the difference between socially and privately optimal be-
haviour is
s1 − q∗1,a = p
√
dλ (c− d)− dλ
(c− d) d (1− p) .
If λ > λ∗ = c−d
d
, s1 < q
∗
1,a and there is over-provision of high effort (if q
∗
1,a > 0). From
the definitions in section 3.1, (Equations 4 and 5), λ∗ < Λ1 < λ1. High effort is provided
by some members of this sub-population if λ > Λ1 so we can conclude that there will be
over-provision of effort if λ falls between Λ1 and λ1, but never under-provision.
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Similarly for the lower class, social optimality requires the maximization of s0(u (1 + λ)+
(1− u)λ (p− pus0) / (1− pus0) − c) + (1− s0)λ (p− pus0) / (1− pus0). This is a convex
function of s0; thus the socially optimal s0 is either 0 when
λ < λ∗ =
c− u
u (1− p)2 (1− pu) ,
or 1 otherwise. From Equations 4 and 5, the critical values Λ0 and λ0 are both less than
λ∗ (Λ0 ≤ λ0 ≤ λ∗). Thus over-provision of effort can happen for Λ0 < λ < λ∗ and does
happen for λ0 < λ < λ
∗ for lower class agents. Approbation-seeking results in a waste, as
in most models in which agents engage in a comparable form of social contest.
Consider now the case of relative approbation seeking. Total welfare is written as the
sum of the contributions of all 4 types of players (though both the social and private optima
for the talentless poor and the smart rich are to play e, the measure of talentless rich and
smart poor expending E affects their contribution to global welfare). A quadratic form
obtains, which is strictly concave in s0 and s1. The first order conditions are thus sufficient
to characterize the unique socially optimal proportion of agents in each class who should
expend E, which are
s0 =
1
2
−xuλ− c+ u+ uλ
(1− x)u2λp ,
s1 =
1
2
2λxd2p+ xpλ2d− λxdp+ c+ λxd− d− 2λxd2
(p− 1)λxd2 .
When these values lie in the unit square they characterize the unique socially optimal effort
levels in each of the relevant groups.20 Computing the difference between social and private
optimality yields
s0 − q∗0,A =
1
2u
c− d− dλ
λpd (1− x) ,
s1 − q∗1,A =
1
2d
uλxp (1− λ) + u− c
uλx (1− p) .
Thus for lower class, the possibility of under-provision arises as soon as λ < (c− d) /d
(recall c > d), that is, under provision is possible and associated with small values of the
approbation motive λ. In the upper class under provision demands that λ (1− λ) > c−u
uxp
,
that is, the approbation motive λ should be neither too small nor too large.
In the case of relative approbation seeking, a waste does not necessarily obtain; the quest
for a higher quantile position can yield a suboptimal outcome in the form of a shortage
rather than an over-provision of effort.
5 Conclusion
Though being considered a talented person does not really make one economically better off,
it is something we tend to value positively. What I wear, which car I drive and where I spend
20It is straightforward to check that for the values (p, λ, u, d, c) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.79, 0.8, 0.81), over the interval
x ∈ (0.759, 0.949) the optimum is strictly within the unit square, and there is under-provision of effort by
the upper class. Given the continuity of the functions, we can conclude that for a non-degenerate area of
the parameter space, under-provision of effort is the equilibrium.
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my week-ends can all be considered correlated with ability, but probably a more revealing
signal is my social mobility, as measured by my educational or professional achievement
relative to that of my parents. The model developed here is about how individual incentives
affect the evolution of social structure and about how the system of social mobility self-
regulates.
In the model, an inherent concern for social approbation (a concern for status, if status
is determined by ranking on the scale of approbation) is transformed into an instrumental
concern for social class. It is not simply class per se, however, in the sense in which
approbation arises from class in an aristocracy. Rather, it is a concern for what we have
termed “destination class”, that is, the class an agent is in after mobility has taken place.
Comparing origin and destination class is what permits public inference about the trait on
which approbation is determined. Thus it is mobility between classes (or lack of it) rather
than the class into which one is born that matters for our agents. Because mobility is a
source of well-being to individuals and they actively seek it, social structure changes over
time and we study the types of organizations that form.
One interesting result that emerges is that in spite of the fact that social mobility is
determined purely on meritocratic principles, society can organize into an aristocracy. One
of the over-arching concerns in empirical studies of social mobility is the extent to which
a society is “meritocratic”.21 This debate is conducted by examining different empirical
measures of mobility between social classes. But our results suggest that the issue may be
more subtle. Is a society meritocratic if it has the right kind of mobility, or is it meritocratic
if it has the right kind of incentives? If the latter, it m y not be enough to look at mobility
in order to conclude that a society is or is not a meritocracy. When the trait on which social
approbation is granted is relatively common, then a society with meritocratic incentives
will have as its characteristic social “mobility regime” a dynasty. All children end up in
the social class into which they were born. Indeed, because everyone is presumed to be
of high ability, if a low origin agent rises this has little effect on people’s estimates of his
ability, owing to the initial presumption that he was high ability. Thus the effort needed
to rise in status produces little value in terms of approbation. On the other hand, if a high
origin agent falls, this is an unambiguous signal that he is of low ability. Thus the effort
needed to stay in the upper class is worth it. These effects combine to produce a frozen
inter-generational social structure.
In the second part of the paper, we modify how approbation enters the utility function to
capture a competition for rank in the approbation distribution. Indirectly, this introduces
a feedback between the social structure on the one hand, and effort and social mobility on
the other. Effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenized. In contrast with the
simple model, here the weight of approbation in the utility function has a different effect
on stable structures. In this case, dynasties can only emerge when concern for approbation
is weak, whereas in the previous case they emerged for intermediate levels of concern. A
second effect of the introduction of competition for approbation rank has to do with welfare:
without the rank competition, neither class ever under-provides effort, but can over-provide
effort for some parameter values. With rank competition, however, under-provision of effort
by either class (or both of them) is possible.
21See the debate between Saunders, who finds the UK to be highly meritocratic, and Breen and
Goldthorpe (1999), who do not (and our discussion on p. 3).
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Looking slightly beyond the model permits an interesting suggestion about how mobility
could change over time. One can imagine that from time to time new approbation traits
emerge. Suddenly something new, ability in mathematics for example, becomes highly
esteemed. One would expect that initially esteem is given to relatively rare traits. When
this is the case, social mobility itself demonstrates meritocratic features. When low ability
is presumed (that is when the approbation trait is rare), then a rise by a low origin agent
is an unambiguous signal of high ability, while the fall of a high origin agent will not
change very much the public opinion about his ability. Thus low origin agents have strong
incentives to work hard, but high origin agents have only very weak incentives. High ability,
industrious poor advance; low ability, lazy rich fall, and the mobility “looks meritocratic”.
But when possession of a trait provides utility, a rational response is to invest. We often
see parents forcing children to invest (typically in education) so they will acquire these rare
traits for which approbation is granted. Rarity falls, and mobility will be reduced, possibly
disappearing altogether as the trait becomes too common and society moves into a frozen
dynastic structure. This changes not only the nature of mobility, but also which part of
the population works hard. Initially it is the striving, high ability poor, but eventually it
is the defensive, low ability rich. If upper class income were determined not only by the
size of the class but also by the ability of those earning it, social welfare could increase if
high-ability agents populated the upper class. Thus a shift from an uncommon to common
approbation trait, and the consequent move from a meritocracy to a dynastic structure,
would have negative implications for social welfare.
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